The People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) response to Speaker Pelosi’s recent visit to Taiwan raises the specter of something hitherto largely neglected—the possibility that the PRC might resort to actions short of overt military force to subjugate Taiwan. One such measure the PRC might employ would be a quarantine.

That possibility was examined in a February 2021 Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) report by Robert Blackwill and Philip Zelikow. They envisioned a PRC air and sea cordon through which most people and goods heading to Taiwan would be allowed to pass, but suspect flights or shipping could be diverted to mainland ports and airports, to be cleared by PRC officials. This differs from a blockade in which all Taiwanese imports would be blocked to coerce its people into submission.

There are historical precedents for such an action, most importantly the 1962 Cuban missile crisis when JFK ordered a naval “quarantine” of Cuba, to distinguish his action from a blockade which would be considered an act of war, hoping thereby to minimize the risk of lethal force being used, with all of its attendant consequences.

Blackwill and Zelikow also note important similarities in the efforts by both sides during the several Berlin crises of the Cold War to secure favorable outcomes without the overt use of force in a situation where each feared the risks of escalation.  A subsequent report from the RAND Corporation also discusses a quarantine scenario, described in similar terms, but without the Berlin references (and curiously without reference to the CFR report).

A quarantine could include a variety of scenarios requiring a response from a US coalition, but one possibility neither report considers would be a quarantine limited to ocean‑going traffic. Adding an air quarantine would entail the greater risks of diverting aircraft in flight while it would also put greater pressure on Taiwan. To limit risk, the PRC might impose a sea-based quarantine first, while reserving the option to escalate to a quarantine of air traffic. It might further hope to lower its risk profile by employing the Coast Guard (CCG) or the People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia Force (PAFMM) to harass and even board ships heading to Taiwan, under a law imposed in January 2021, to avoid the use of higher-profile People’s Liberation Army Navy, or Air force assets. That law specifically authorizes the creation of temporary exclusion zones to keep other vessels from entering PRC-claimed waters and to board and inspect vessels attempting to do so. It also authorizes the use of “all necessary means” to counter threats from foreign vessels.

As both reports note, a quarantine puts the burden on the US and its allies to respond. Options for doing so might include economic sanctions or providing military escorts for selectively reflagged merchant vessels. However, the PRC has its own economic leverage instruments and escorting reflagged ships increases the risk of direct military confrontation.

In short, crafting an effective response to a PRC quarantine of Taiwan is a challenging prospect. But it appears to have received little attention thus far. Yet, allowing such an action to go unanswered also poses dangers. A US failure to respond to a PRC quarantine might embolden the PRC, leading to actions so provocative that they cause the very war we hope to prevent. Unfortunately, there is no simple answer to the question of how to respond effectively to a PRC quarantine of Taiwan while avoiding armed conflict. 

However, when thinking through response options, it would be useful, as Blackwill and Zelikow suggest, to reflect on US handling of the Berlin crises during the Cold War. Given the similarities between Berlin and Taiwan, it’s surprising that more has not been written about those similarities. Taiwan, like Berlin previously, is a “problem left over from history” as the Communists like to call it, with an unclear international legal status. Like Berlin, it is physically isolated and confronts an enemy with conventional military superiority. It has also become a beacon of democracy as West Berlin was more than half a century ago. Moreover, like Berlin then, Taiwan challenges the legitimacy of its communist neighbor and presents a test of American resolve to defend freedom in the face of aggression. This is more than “just” a humanitarian or moral concern. The implications for the strength of American alliances and “Great Power” balances are significant, and a comprehensive analysis of the Berlin analogy might help us to think about how the US could effectively address the quarantine dilemma.

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