The Omnibus Appropriations Act and the Curious Incident of the Dog That Doesn’t Bark

With the passage of another continuing resolution (CR) last week, we are ever closer to the end of Congress debacle that will fund the remaining 20 percent of federal government spending the Appropriations Committees are still responsible for. As usual, the dire consequences of what would happen to our nation’s defenses in the absence of a deal is a primary compelling argument for a final omnibus appropriations agreement.

Prior to September 30 when the government’s fiscal year ends and appropriations are supposed to be completed (but never are), the Department of Defense (DoD) and military leaders, members of Congress, ex-defense officials, and defense contractors begin beating the drum about the devastating impacts CRs have on defense operations and the development of future capabilities. For months, Americans hear about the congressional dereliction of duty arising from its failure to pass a defense appropriations bill on time, putting our soldiers, sailors, airmen, guardians, and marines in greater harm’s way . . . and yet, DoD has been forced to operate under CRs for 13 of the past 14 years.

As the national security community performs its part in this annual theater there should be some thought given to a situation described in Conan Doyle’s “Adventure of Silver Blaze” when Sherlock Holmes refers to “the curious incident of the dog in the night-time.” The dog in our case being advocates for domestic government spending.  As Scotland Yard’s inspector responded to Holmes: “The dog did nothing in the night-time.” To which Holmes replies: “That was the curious incident.” Think about it, barely a peep or a bark has been heard over the last several decades about any crippling effects CRs have on the rest of government. 

It is important to unpack this deafening silence. As Holmes deduced when something expected doesn’t happen there is much knowledge to be gained from that fact. Understanding the why begins with the simple case that CRs just do not impact domestic agencies the way they impact defense. Not surprisingly, this is done on purpose. Every year defense becomes a prisoner to be traded to fund more domestic spending and tacked on last-minute non-defense legislation. Every year defense advocates are taken to the cleaners. 

The Pentagon can be taken hostage because budgetary rule sets are different for defense than they are for domestic agencies. This has been cleverly orchestrated and strengthened over the years to make a CR hurt DoD more than anyone else. Appropriations law and the PPBE budget process have uniquely for defense been the source of draconian restrictions on starting new efforts, a plethora of budget accounts, and limitations on the ability to move money around and within those accounts. Any new potential or found source of defense budgetary flexibility and agility is quickly closed to maintain a hostage situation. Within CRs that are approved, specific provisions are included to further limit DoD’s use of funds while so-called “anomalies” designed to alleviate some of the waste and inefficiencies arising from CRs are rarely granted for defense.

Domestic programs have few if any of these underlying issues. Those advocating for greater government expansion have been careful not to inflict the same pain on domestic program budgeting as is wreaked on defense. Supporters of defense have been clueless by not trying to address the impacts that differing appropriations and budgetary rules have on defense and non-defense operations. Unequal processes and effects ultimately undermine one’s negotiating position—a dynamic that is again playing out in this year’s omnibus.

As hard as it is to imagine, the situation is really worse for defense due to the “mandatory spending bait and switch” process and subsequent calls for “parity” in domestic and defense spending. Over the decades an ever-increasing amount of domestic spending has been moved from discretionary to mandatory spending (where 70 percent of government spending now resides).  Moving money out of the discretionary baseline then seemingly makes it look like defense is getting a larger share of the “public” budget. A progressive mantra ensues for “fairness” and “parity” in discretionary spending which is achieved in any new 50-50 spending deal. Repeat the bait-and-switch process and you get to do it all over again. It never gets old. If you are lucky enough to have an economic crisis or even a perceived one, trillions in stimulus spending can be added to the domestic spending ledger, none of which goes to defense.

As a result, the latest CBO numbers show that DoD now comprises just 10 percent of federal spending outlays when net interest, mandatory and stimulus spending are put into the mix. In the six-decade-long “guns vs butter” war, defense lost long ago and continues to lose more ground every year. 

The dog didn’t bark because it doesn’t need to.

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