The killing of Qassim Sulaymani
and Abu Mehdi al-Muhandis creates tremendous risks for the Kurdistan Regional
Government.

Although there is some risk that
Kurdistan could become a battleground for the US and Iran, that danger seems
low at this time. Instead, the much greater risk is that the killings will
result in the eviction of US troops from Iraq. Washington’s refusal to come to
the assistance of the KRG during the joint Iraqi-Iranian offensive at Kirkuk in
2017 was a huge blow to the KRG’s security, autonomy, and freedom of action,
but the residual US troop presence left the Kurds with a small, vital breathing
space from domination by Tehran and Baghdad. If American troops are forced to
leave Iraq, as the Iraqi parliament and government are already threatening, the
Kurds truly will have no friends but the mountains.

If the US troops are going to be
evicted from Iraq, it does create a small opportunity for the KRG, but only a very
small one. In those circumstances, Iraq’s Shi’a leadership will desperately
want Kurdish (and Arab Sunni) support for ousting the Americans. At least in
theory, the Kurdish parties could offer to vote in favor of the move in return
for Baghdad agreeing to a favorable deal on oil and revenues, perhaps even an
extension of the terms of the current Iraqi budget law. I want to stress
that this would ultimately be a terrible outcome for the Kurds — they need the
US troop presence far more than a favorable deal with Baghdad, in part because
with US troops gone it would be hard for them to ensure that Baghdad complies
with any such agreement — but if they are going to be forced to accept such a
bad situation, this might be a way to secure something of a consolation
prize.

In theory, getting evicted from
Iraq might cause Washington to see the KRG as a strategic alternative. For that
reason, there is some possibility that if Baghdad voted to evict the US troops,
the Trump Administration might to try to keep them in the KRG. This would
be very difficult and highly risky for both the US and the Kurds in
practice. It would be illegal under international law and would constitute de
facto American recognition of Kurdish independence, which would drive Baghdad,
Tehran, Damascus, and Ankara insane. Especially at a moment when few in the
Middle East want to be seen as openly siding with a Washington widely-viewed in
the Middle East as ignorant and out-of-control, it would invite Iranian (and
Iraqi militia) attacks on the KRG and the American forces there. Moreover,
Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Turkey might all opt to blockade the KRG and close their
air space to flights to and from Kurdistan, which would put tremendous economic
pressure on Erbil and could make it impossible for the United States to supply
its troops in the KRG.

In fact, just this line of
thinking could be dangerous for the Kurds. If the Trump administration began to
see things in this strategic light, it might press the KRG to allow it to move
US troops there to use the KRG as an American base against Iran and its
regional allies (which include Syria and, increasingly, Iraq). While this has
long been the dream of many Iraqi Kurdish leaders, under the current circumstances
it could be a poison pill.

For the reasons I enumerated
above, the current circumstances would make it extremely difficult to pull off
a rebasing of American forces to the KRG and if it were to fail, it would be
far more disastrous for the Kurds than for the Americans. The KRG leadership would
probably recognize this beforehand and so would be loath to accept such an
American offer, but neither would it want to turn the offer down for fear of
antagonizing Washington at a moment when the US Administration is flailing
about for allies, and potentially ready to punish anyone that did not
demonstrate sufficient support. In other words, the very request would put the
KRG on the horns of an awful dilemma.

Only if the Kurds were certain
that one or more of its neighbors (Turkey is the obvious candidate) would
continue to trade with the KRG and allow transportation to and from the outside
world would this make sense for Erbil. Again, given current sentiment toward
the Trump administration in the Middle East, coupled with Ankara’s own
ambivalent relations with Washington, this is far from certain, and the United
States creating a de facto independent Iraqi Kurdish state would only make it
less likely that Turkey would go along.

Finally, the ongoing fragmentation and divisions within the KRG leadership would only make this all harder. We can’t rule out that one Kurdish faction might choose to side with the Americans or the Iraqis or the Iranians, specifically as a way of hurting one or more rival Kurdish factions. Doing so — which has been an unfortunate Kurdish tradition for decades — would not only exacerbate those internal divisions, it potentially makes the KRG beholden to foreign interests in ways that would be very problematic for the Kurds. Take the circumstances above: Imagine if one Kurdish faction decided that by agreeing to a demand from Washington to accept US troops this would cripple its Kurdish rivals and enable it to take power in Erbil. That faction would then find itself in charge of the KRG, but saddled with the potentially disastrous need to allow American troops to be based there. If, as I speculate, the Iraqis, Syrians, Iranians, and Turks responded by blockading the KRG and closing down its airspace, that faction might end up presiding over the economic ruin of the KRG and would still likely lose the US troop presence at some point. That would be disastrous for them, and for Kurdistan.

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