Saudi Arabia’s war in Yemen

Seven years ago, Saudi Arabia launched a military
intervention against the Houthis in Yemen. The Saudi-led coalition’s
intervention was supposed to be a quick victory against an upstart
Iranian-backed group and a feather in the cap of the newly named Saudi defense
minister, Mohammed bin Salman, the heir-apparent to the aging King. That
victory remains elusive. Instead, Saudi Arabia is now in a worse strategic
situation than when it entered the Yemen conflict in March 2015.

War came to the kingdom in the form of missile and drone
attacks on airports,
oil
infrastructure
, and now water
desalination facilities
. The Saudi role in exacerbating Yemen’s
humanitarian crisis has hurt the kingdom’s image and added to the growing
distance between the United States and its Gulf partner. The Saudis have
signaled a willingness to negotiate but won’t cede Yemen to the Houthis for the
same reason now–Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman intervened in the first place:
Iran.

Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman speaks during televised interview in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, April 27, 2021. Picture taken April 27, 2021. Bandar Algaloud/Courtesy of Saudi Royal Court/Handout via REUTERS

What began as a limited investment in the
Houthis for Iran has matured
to yield substantial dividends, challenging the current regional security
architecture. Before the Saudi-led intervention, Iran’s inputs into Yemen were
enough to begin developing the Houthis — military training, especially through
Hezbollah in Syria; media assistance; and some funding — but not game changing.
However, over the course of 2015, Iran placed increasingly senior operatives on
the Yemen portfolio. Iran and Hezbollah have since transferred expertise for
the indigenous production of land mines and small drones, which the Houthis
have used domestically against opposing forces in the civil war, and smuggled
advanced weaponry to the Houthis that has greatly expanded the scope of Yemen’s
conflict.

This Iranian-sourced proliferation of sophisticated missiles
and short- and long-range drones to the Houthis in Yemen presents the most
“consequential threat” to US forces and their partners in the Middle East, according to
head of US Central Command General Kenneth F. McKenzie. The US military forces
at Al Dhafra Air Base in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates, fired
interceptor missiles
at least twice in early 2022 to defend against
incoming Houthi-launched ballistic missiles. The Houthis’ potential
range
extends to Israel, creating the possibility of a regional escalation
as tensions with Iran rise.

Dollar-for-dollar, the relative cost of the drone or missile
compared to the defensive systems to counter an attack heavily favors the
Houthis. Mid-range, mid-size drones used in Houthi attacks cost multiple orders
of magnitude less than the $1-million missile interceptors used to shoot them
down. Even though Saudi defenses are capable of thwarting nearly all Houthi
attacks — upwards of 90
percent
— the cost asymmetry makes this
unsustainable as a way forward over the long term.

Riyadh seems to be unable to find a way out of its Yemen
mess. A renewed push to sue for peace faces the same obstacles as previous
efforts. Namely, the Houthis would lose more in negotiating a political
resolution than they currently stand to gain by continuing to fight. The
Houthis are savvy enough to signal interest in talks, seeing the opportunity to
extract concessions to secure even their participation in the engagements. They
welcomed the UN Special Envoy for Yemen Hans
Grundberg’s proposed ceasefire
for the Islamic holy month of Ramadan starting
April 2, which would buy them time to reset on the ground, and expressed
openness to the Gulf
Cooperation Council’s proposed talks
, slated to be held March 29–April 7, but
declined the invitation, demanding talks be held in a “neutral” country and not
Saudi Arabia.

The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps’ equipping of the
Houthis with advanced weaponry — and the Houthis’ willingness to play Iran’s
game — has put Saudi Arabia in a lose-lose position. Riyadh has actively sought
to negotiate a ceasefire to end the Houthi attacks on Saudi territory. Ending
military involvement in Yemen would also be a step toward repairing the now troubled
relationship with the Biden administration. Yet Riyadh cannot accept the
Houthis’ threat on the southern border and control over most of Yemen. To
withdraw support — including military — for the Yemeni forces opposing the
Houthis would ensure the Houthis will remain in power for the foreseeable
future, creating an enduring Iranian threat from Yemen for Saudi Arabia.

American interests are now inextricably tied up in the Yemen conflict, which has contributed to worsening regional stability and bogged down America’s Gulf partners. Continuing pressure on Saudi Arabia to end its contribution to the war is a fruitless — and at times, counterproductive — endeavor. The Biden administration’s recent surge in support for the defense of the kingdom is a positive change but will not be enough so long as Iran continues to arm the Houthis. Stemming the weapons flow might compel the Houthis to recalculate as their drone and missile supply dwindles. Such a shift might also be enough to start serious negotiations for peace.

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