Presidential unity and the Afghanistan disaster

The absence of an independent chief executive was one of the
most important shortcomings in the Articles of Confederation identified by the
Founders. The Articles had only a congress with a mix of legislative and
executive authorities and responsibilities. Try as they might, the members of
that body — either as a whole or in committees — were less than effective in
conducting the young nation’s foreign policy and managing its war effort. Independence
was secured, it was said, more in spite of than because of the Confederation Congress’
efforts.

So, it was no surprise that the Constitutional Convention,
meeting in Philadelphia over the sultry, summer months of 1787, produced a new
government grounded on the principle of separation of powers — vesting “the
executive power” in an office manned by a single person, whose selection,
salary, and authorities were largely independent of the new bicameral Congress.

“Publius,” in The
Federalist
, and other defenders of the proposed constitution argued that
this structure would infuse the government with energy and provide it with a
capacity to act with decisiveness, dispatch and, if necessary, secrecy as circumstances
warranted. Having one person invested with the government’s executive power would
increase effectiveness in the area of national security, while also ensuring
clear accountability. There would be no “privy council” or “cabinet government”
to cloud where the public and Congress could point their fingers when a
decision goes awry. As President Truman correctly remarked, when it comes some
decisions, “the buck stops here.”

Over the last few days, we’ve seen both sides of this “unitary
executive.” As numerous accounts have noted, the decision to pull American
troops completely out of Afghanistan over a short period of just a few months
was President Biden’s alone. Again, if the reporting is accurate, and not just
an effort on the part of the Pentagon and the intelligence community to save
face, the president ignored the warnings of the top military, defense and
diplomatic officials both here and in theater that such a precipitous
withdrawal would likely result in problematic to disastrous consequences. As is
well known — mostly because Biden himself has repeatedly said so — he has been
in favor of getting out of Afghanistan for more than a decade. And it was only
now, as president and commander-in-chief, that he could pull that plug.

Biden speaking at White House
United States President Joe Biden delivers remarks on Afghanistan.
POOL via CNP/INSTARimages/Cover Images

Notably, these officials carried out the president’s
decision rather than resigning. The Wall Street Journal reported that both
Secretary of State Antony Blinken and National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan
raised possible problems with the execution of the decision but “ultimately,
neither disagreed with president, knowing where he stood.” In short,
presidential unity stood.

From a national security perspective, this decision by the
president has turned out to be a disaster — a disaster for Afghans, for
American credibility with our allies and partners, and likely for countering
jihadist terrorism in the months and years ahead. Here, the other side of the
unitary executive comes into play; or, at least, it is supposed to. Will the president
be held accountable for his decision and its consequences?

That is far from clear, even though the headlines, tweets,
and videos have rapidly brought home to Americans the immediate results of that
decision. It’s often said that polls showed the public was generally in favor of
getting out of Afghanistan. But that was always an abstract question, devoid of
what that might mean in actuality — the denial of basic rights to the women of
Afghanistan, the creation of new al Qaeda base camps, and the assassination of
Afghans who had helped build a flawed but still functioning democracy. The
public’s answer was also a product of successive presidents failing to make the
case for our presence or even openly dismissing the mission altogether. Absent an
argument for staying, it was predictable that the public would be for doing
less or nothing at all.

Finally, accountability will rest with Congress. Can it do its institutional duty to review what the president has done? Given the state of partisanship on the Hill, it is likely Republicans will be more than willing here, while Democrats will shy away — just the reverse of what we’ve seen in the investigation of the events of January 6. One has to hope that there are a few senators and representatives who see themselves as members of Congress first and party members second. Unfortunately, it is a hope, not a certainty.

The post Presidential unity and the Afghanistan disaster appeared first on American Enterprise Institute – AEI.