The recent sabotage of the Nord Stream pipelines, which caused natural gas to leak into the sea and atmosphere, highlights the threat posed by undersea attacks on critical infrastructure. In addition to natural gas pipelines, the submerged internet cables that keep the world connected could be an appetizing target for rogue actors.

A single cable being severed would have far less impact on highly connected nations like the United States than it would on smaller countries that rely on a few key points of connection. For example, in 2007, a Vietnamese fisherman reeled in miles of the country’s internet cable, causing partial disruptions in the country’s internet access that lasted more than a month. When a Georgian woman severed a land-based internet cable in 2011, the entire country of Armenia was without internet for hours. For those who live in places relying on a limited number of cables, the effect of an attack could be widespread. Entire businesses may rely on internet connectivity that passes through undersea cables.

Unlike a natural gas leak, which disturbs surface water, damaging an undersea internet cable could be difficult to detect. There are more than 1.2 million kilometers of cable traversing the globe, many of which span entire oceans. While operators can send signals through cables to determine the rough location of damage, a submersible is often dispatched to confirm the site in need of repair.

Authoritarian governments and rogue actors have kept a close eye on these cables and know exactly where to find their most vulnerable points. China has already developed tools to spy on communications traveling through underwater cables. Out at sea, Russian spy ships and submarines traveling near undersea cables have caught the attention of US officials.

Outside of state actors, terror groups are a threat to undersea cables. Even without the ability to attack them on the ocean floor, the sites where these cables connect to land must be secured. As a 2017 report from UK MP Rishi Sunak warned, cable landing points “often have minimal protection, making them vulnerable to terrorism. A foiled Al-Qaeda plot to destroy a key London internet exchange in 2007 illustrates the credibility of the threat.”

The Nord Stream sabotage was revealing as it shows the problems governments face when responding to these kinds of gray-zone attacks, which cause serious disruptions but fall short of a conventional military strike. Firstly, there is the issue of attribution. Rogue actors denying their hostile behavior is nothing new, but attacks on undersea infrastructure can be even more difficult to attribute than those on land. This task is complicated further by a chaotic information space, where government representatives and internet users are often free to trade baseless theories.

The second issue is fixing a cable once it has been attacked. After finding the site of the damage, workers have to hoist the cable to the surface, fix or replace the broken section, then lower the cable back to the sea floor. This is an expensive operation requiring specialized equipment. Workers must also face weather conditions and potentially hostile actors aiming to disrupt their repairs. In the event of a multi-site attack on several cables, especially one preceding larger military actions, repair operations could be extraordinarily time-consuming.

For world leaders watching the Nord Stream sabotage unfold, the most important lesson should be that of preparation. Instead of simply waiting until undersea attacks on infrastructure happen, countries must plan for these scenarios and broadcast elements of their response ahead of time. This would serve not only as a means to cooperate with other nations on maintaining safe infrastructure but also as a deterrent to rogue actors. Intelligence officials warned of an attack on Nord Stream last summer, but it yielded little in the way of planning or deterrence. To prevent another attack on undersea infrastructure, world leaders must take this threat more seriously.

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