The Special Investigator for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) has released the latest quarterly report to Congress, reminding us again of the costly irrelevancy this office has become.
The SIGAR was established by the fiscal year 2008 National Defense Authorization Act—when it seemed it may be useful to have a separate inspector general (IG) to focus on: “audits and investigations to: 1) promote efficiency and effectiveness of reconstruction programs and 2) detect and prevent waste, fraud, and abuse.”
Instead, the SIGAR has repeatedly obscured what benefits it accumulated with its prosecutorial tone and approach to releasing reports that seemed suspiciously geared toward obtaining headlines rather than improving use of and accountability for taxpayer funds.
The latest SIGAR quarterly report to Congress begins by complaining that “the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), which administers the majority of U.S. government spending for Afghanistan, and the Treasury Department refused to cooperate with SIGAR, while the State Department was selective in the information it provided” and didn’t share details of agency-supported programs in Afghanistan.
I wonder why that would be the case? Maybe because the US no longer has a presence in Afghanistan enabling the collection of reliable detailed information. Maybe because SIGAR has been wasting the time of staff with requests for information for years, even before the disgraceful exit of the US from Afghanistan, with greatly diminishing outcomes.
For example, it was not uncommon for the Defense Department to repeatedly respond to duplicative and detailed information requests from SIGAR staff for data previously provided and questions that had been asked and answered because the data had been lost by SIGAR.
The SIGAR team seemed unable (or unwilling) to keep track of records previously submitted either due to staff turnover without systems in place to store information or lax record-keeping that they would not begin to tolerate from those they audited. There were jokes that someone should audit SIGAR. But, given the staff time consumed in responding to, not new or updated, but duplicative and repetitive information requests, it was not really very funny.
The recent quarterly report also contains an essay on “Stifling of the Afghan Media” which concludes that: “without long-term, institutional support to independent journalists inside and outside of the country, Afghanistan’s media may not be able to withstand the Taliban’s efforts to totally control the flow of information about the country.”
In addition, SIGAR found that women and girls now face significant risks including “reduced access to education and healthcare; loss of empowerment, including the ability to be economically and otherwise independent; and heightened personal safety and security risks.” SIGAR concluded that current conditions are similar to those under the Taliban in the 1990s.
Do we really need a separate auditor with a $55 million budget to make such obvious observations?
Oversight and accountability are important. No doubt about it. That is why we have IGs all over the federal government, including robust offices at State and Defense who should pick up this work while invigorating a critical partnership for oversight of aid to Ukraine.
The US no longer has forces or presence in Afghanistan. The SIGAR statute and charge have been overcome by events. It is past time to sunset this organization.
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