“Justice must not only be done, but also seen to be done.”

The implications of English Lord Chief Justice Gordon Hewart’s words are poignant in the United States this week as the January 6 Committee recommended that the Justice Department file criminal charges against former President Donald Trump for his involvement with the group that stormed the Capitol in an attempted coup to overturn the 2020 presidential election result.

Concurrently, Fiji has been embroiled in its own “contested election.” December 14 saw Fiji First, the incumbent party led by former head of the country’s military, Vorenge (Frank) Bainimarama, face off against Sitiveni (Steve) Rabuka’s People’s Alliance Party and its coalition partner, the Biman Prasad–led National Federation Party and Viliame (William) Gavoka’s Social Democratic Liberal Party (Sodelpa). A coalition of the latter three led by Rabuka has prevailed—for now.

Two defining features, both with ominous implications for the United States, characterize Fiji’s election.

First, both major parties (Fiji First and the Alliance) are led by former coup leaders. (Fiji has had four coups since 1987, so it is informally known as “coup-coup land.”) Both leaders have faced probing judicial inquiries into their activities, but both have survived in large part because the issues they advocate are defining features of Fijian politics.

Rabuka (third in command of the Royal Fiji Military Services) led two coups, in May and September 1987, following the election of a multiethnic, Labour-led coalition over the indigenous-led government. (At the time, Fiji’s population was approximately 46 percent indigenous Fijian and 49 percent ethnic Indo-Fijian.) Rabuka and 10 armed, masked militia members took over the Fijian House of Representatives bloodlessly on May 14, claiming indigenous Fijian concerns about racial discrimination.  A constitutional review committee recommended electoral changes. The Fijian Supreme Court found the coup to have been unconstitutional and charged the governor-general to broker negotiations to form a new government. Fearing loss of the first coup’s gains, Rabuka (by now promoted to head of the Royal Fiji Military Services) staged a second coup on September 25. On October 10, he abrogated the constitution, removed the governor-general from office, and declared himself head of the interim military government. Despite strong international condemnation, no action was taken. A new Fiji constitution was ratified in 1990.

Following the 1999 election of a mixed-ethnicity coalition, businessman George Speight, backed by members of Fiji’s Counter Revolutionary Warfare Unit, stormed Parliament on May 19, 2000, taking members hostage and claiming power on behalf of indigenous Fijians. Law and order in Fiji broke down. The chief justice advised then head of the Republic of Fiji Military Forces, Frank Bainimarama, to take control of the country as a matter of necessity, which he duly did. On November 15, Fiji’s High Court declared the interim government illegal and the former government was reinstated.

Bainimarama led his own coup on December 4–6 2006, at the request of the president, following a political impasse related to matters arising from the 2000 coup. He claimed his coup was different because it was his duty as leader of the armed forces to assume control in the face of a government losing all semblance of credibility, honesty, integrity, and financial solvency. While decried by the Great Council of Chiefs and the Fiji Council of Churches, the coup was supported by the Fiji Human Rights Commission. Again, international condemnation—but no action—ensued. The High Court subsequently found that the president had acted lawfully when asking Bainimarama to intervene.  Martial law remained in force until 2014.

The second issue arises from the efforts of those in power to constrain freedom of speech and from fears that official messaging may be misleading. 

In 1987, Rabuka obtained control of mainstream media outlets before taking parliament. However, he omitted a new radio station (FM96), which announced the coup to the world, thereby denying Rabuka that privilege. Under Bainimarama’s martial regime, strict controls were placed on press freedom, culminating in the 2010 Media Industry Development Decree, which subsequently resulted in deleterious effects for Fijian democracy.

And because of its history, fears exist that any election in Fiji may be potentially corrupted. Hence, the latest election was overseen by an international monitoring group. Despite no irregularities being reported, many locals are not satisfied. In part, this is due to the Fiji Elections Office’s vote count reporting app going “off air” and reporting a very different count balance when reappearing. While the outage and discrepancy were said to be operational matters (mistimed data uploads), this is not easily verifiable by the observers.  

So the US is warned: Judicial proceedings may attribute responsibility, but if the issues prevail, so will the coup attempts. Transparency, while laudable, is fraught with difficulties of its own. Managing the message matters manifestly.

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