Defense Innovation Leadership: A Postscript

There is a needed addendum to my last article on the trials and tribulations of Mike Brown, the former Director of the Defense Innovation Unit (DIU), that prevented his confirmation as Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment. The significance of the weaponization of the Department of Defense (DOD) Inspector General’s (IG) investigative process became ever more apparent after the current head of DOD acquisition’s recent tirade against the “tech bros” of Silicon Valley. While production has a near term urgency, this rant completely misses the essence of where global innovation currently resides and reinforces the adage that “people are policy.” With no Ash Carter around to take defense acquisition leadership to the woodshed, the costs of Brown’s upended nomination will be felt for decades to come. 

Those who thought the Brown case was a targeted character assassination were unfortunately proven right when it was subsequently reported that one week after his final day on the job at DIU, the IG finally cleared Brown of all the allegations that had hung over him from a complaint filed by a disgruntled ex-DIU employee more than two and a half years earlier. 

The Brown story is a sad and sordid Washington tale. The details are pretty straightforward. He came to Washington to run DIU four years ago to accelerate the adoption of commercial technology at DOD and strengthen the national security industrial base. Based on his background as a Silicon Valley CEO and his work at DIU Brown was nominated for the most senior DOD acquisition position in early April 2021.

As with all defense nominees, his paperwork was submitted to the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) from the White House after a complete character assessment, FBI background check, and comprehensive financial and tax disclosure. His meetings with SASC members were largely complete and both Republicans and Democrats were broadly in support of his nomination. The committee was preparing to schedule a formal hearing in June 2021. He seemed like a slam dunk for confirmation.

Then the wheels came off. Due to a questionable set of allegations about DIU’s hiring practices, the IG first spent six weeks deciding if it needed to investigate, and then a full 18 months to do so. The allegations in question were not new as they were delivered to both DIU management and the IG a full year before Brown’s nomination. The IG did nothing then while DOD lawyers reviewed and thoroughly investigated the allegations, ultimately issuing an 80-page report stating there were no improper hiring practices. The IG had access to all of this before it decided to open a new investigation—which it did only after Brown was nominated by the president. 

What is most surprising about this case is the IG should have figured out pretty quickly that since the allegation of wrongdoing was about hiring practices, DIU has nodirect hiring authority at all and is only a selecting organization: Each hiring selection that DIU made had to be approved by both the Office of the Undersecretary for Research and Engineering and Washington Headquarters Service. If there were improper hiring practices, it would be those organizations at fault and the IG should have investigated their compliance practices.

If, however, the IG wanted to derail the Brown nomination it was highly successful at doing that as the impact of its announced investigation was almost immediate. After deciding to open a full investigation in late June 2021, the IG informed the White House Presidential Personnel Office that this investigation might take up to a full year or more. Instead of pushing back on the IG’s timeline, the administration, with a backbone the consistency of the wilted lettuce that outlasted the last British Prime Minister, did not. Brown withdrew his candidacy almost immediately when no one had his back. It then took nine more months to fill what is the most critical acquisition position in the government with a nominee more in line with values of the traditional industrial base.

As others have pointed out, this investigation should have been completed in one month. The real problem is not that the IG chose to investigate, it’s that it took a year and half to thoroughly debunk frivolous charges that ended a nomination. The time it took for the IG to publish its acquittal letter either illustrates its incredible sheer incompetence or a callous acquiescence in the face of how malign influences are using the IG investigations system.

One may ask why did the IG even bother to opine after Brown had left the government? The damage had already been done as the country was deprived of the service of someone who could have in the early days of the Biden administration shaken up the government’s innovation system and led efforts to put DOD back on track to outcompete China. Congress should be asking questions.

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