Given that the Secretary of Defense was the commander in charge of the Middle East when the US pulled entirely out of Iraq, he should know better than near anybody how unpredictable and expensive the process is. Yet just last week, Secretary Austin said he sees “opportunities” to redirect Afghanistan withdrawal funding to other higher priorities. While that would be helpful if true, a withdrawal windfall is unlikely to materialize.

While there is very little public information on the real financial costs associated with America’s drawdown in Afghanistan, there are plenty of knowable expenses to anticipate. Take, for example, vast amounts of equipment. The US military can decide, on a case-by-case basis, to return it home or elsewhere in the region, trash it, or convert it for host-nation use.

Sending gear home or to somewhere else in the world is costly. The Army found in the Iraq drawdown that air and sealift costs anywhere from two to five times as much as using a wheeled vehicle for transport. And we know — because of Afghanistan’s landlocked terrain and less-than-friendly neighbors — that most equipment will ship out via air and sealift.

The next reduced but ongoing expense after withdrawal is support for the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces. The Pentagon plans to support these forces primarily financially, which includes supporting contracts and paying salaries, along with continued funding of “key capabilities, such as the Afghan Air Force and Special Mission Wing.” The most recent defense appropriations bill allocates $3 billion for the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund, and the US and its coalition partners provide an additional $1.5 billion to the Afghanistan military on top of salaries.

Further, America and
allied nations support these same security forces with maintenance, logistics,
training, and other extensive contracts. There are at least 13,000 defense
contractors in Afghanistan helping to maintain Afghan
National Defense and Security Forces equipment, manage their supply
chains, and train new soldiers, pilots, and policemen. US Central Command
commander Marine General Kenneth McKenzie has said he is looking into as much
“distance contracting” as he can to keep this level of support so Afghan
security forces do not collapse when we depart. 

Decisions about which contracts to pay a penalty
to break versus those to let run their course and pay the agreed-upon price
until conclusion are being made now in real time. Same with the decisions to
turn over real estate to the Afghan government, including what costs are needed
to modify, fortify, or simplify when possible.

Finally, significant investments will continue to be needed in so-called “over the horizon” counterterrorism mission support and infrastructure — including persistent surveillance and pressure on insurgents. Again, Gen. McKenzie has talked about simply moving forces within and around the Middle East to do this. Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman Jack Reed (R-RI) has gone further and called for the US to stay in the region in “a meaningful capacity” by building counterterror infrastructure “on the periphery of Afghanistan.” This would include new construction costs above and beyond those required to leave.

While it is impossible to know the future, it is clear that a counterterror posture on Afghanistan’s periphery is likely to be more complicated and expensive than boots on the ground inside the country. The Secretary of Defense would be wise to rein in expectations now about the potential for a pot of gold at the end of the Afghan pullout rainbow. It just ain’t gonna happen.

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