For over a century now, documented history shows that American policymakers consistently—and wrongly—assume wars will be short. The only optimistic assumption planners should make is that the United States will likely guess wrong ahead of time about the location, duration, and scale and type of violence employed in war.

Knowing we will surely fail to see the future accurately, the goal should be robust preparation, resiliency, and depth—in the armed forces and the defense industrial base—so that the nation gets it “less wrong” once the conflict begins. This is in addition to continuously assessing what will not change in future hostilities.

This starts with—among other priorities—serious planning for mobilization of troops and the defense industrial base, bolstering prepositioned stocks and reserves, and prioritizing action and partial solutions fielded now over deliberation and compliance across the Defense Department.

The United States should no longer be in the “win by a little” mentality in planning, budgeting, and expanding and deepening the defense industrial base. Just this week at a congressional hearing, former deputy secretary of defense David Norquist was asked by Rep. Joe Wilson (R-SC) what the industrial base can to do increase outputs for Ukraine without sacrificing readiness for peer competition. Sec. Norquist’s response was that changes need to be made by adjusting the expected rates of use for equipment, weapons, and ammunition in conflict.

The assumptions behind America’s classified war plans are too optimistic and therefore short of need when the real wars expose brittle stocks and supplies of key equipment. Ukraine is expending in a month what the United States produces in one full year in certain cases of ammunition.

Further, our war plans and the assumptions behind them also do not account fully for winning the competition and stopping, or deterring, the war from breaking out in the first place. Buying above need for wars alone should be the new standard.

The expectations should be clear up front that this insurance plan requires a costly premium. But an ounce of deterrence is worth much more than a pound of war. The prevention of conflict requires upfront costs and includes some expenses on items that may never be used. But this outcome is still far cheaper than paying to win a war after it begins.

Maintaining steady production lines at levels higher than minimum sustaining rates, such as the U.S. was doing with the Stinger missile before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, would no longer be the model.

All of this investment is worth it since peace does not keep itself. Indeed, as the Reagan Institute’s Roger Zakheim reminds us, former president Ronald Reagan wisely knew that “peace is not obtained or preserved by wishing and weakness. You have consistently urged maintenance of a defense capability that provides a margin of safety for America.”

The military and our industrial base have no slack and no margin. Congress must push the Pentagon to restore this margin and start rebuilding equipment stocks along with the companies that produce them.

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