On October 27, former Israeli Prime Minister Yair Lapid and Lebanese President Michael Aoun separately signed a US-brokered agreement defining the maritime border between their two nations. The agreement paves a path to begin the extraction of natural gas from the Karish gas field that lies on the formerly disputed border. But the bargain is far from an economic cooperation agreement between Lebanon and Israel, does not define the land borders between the two nations, and does not guarantee peace between Israel and Hezbollah. Indeed, it is reasonable to ask, other than throwing a lifeline to the collapsing Lebanese economy, what this deal actually does.
For the Lebanese government, the profits from Karish will serve as an essential tool to calm their citizens during a long-running and debilitating economic crisis. Israel’s government claims that the maritime agreement serves them in three ways: money, security, and recognition. In reality, only minor parts of the Israeli economy will likely benefit, and those dividends pale in comparison to the benefits showered upon Beirut; as for Israel’s claims of recognition and long-lasting security—they do not bear even cursory scrutiny.
Lapid insists that Lebanon and Hezbollah’s tacit recognition of Israel through this written agreement is historic. Few need to be educated about Hezbollah’s antipathy towards the Jewish state, or the security risk it poses. For Hezbollah, any agreement with the Jewish state is antithetical to its core values—and yet, here it is. The Karish agreement is a testament to Lebanon’s dire straits. Yet rather than taking advantage of Hezbollah’s apparent weak standing with its citizens, the Hudson Institute’s Michael Doran argues, “Israel made every conceivable concession; Lebanon [and Hezbollah] made none.”
Internally, Israelis argued that the agreement gives Jerusalem economic leverage over the Lebanese economy. In theory, if war were to break out on Israel’s northern border, Israeli forces could swiftly cut off Lebanese natural gas extraction, the new lifeline of the Lebanese economy. Yet there are several issues here: First, Hezbollah has never evinced any interest in sparing the Lebanese people economic hardship; second, Lapid has repeatedly stated that Hezbollah does not financially benefit from the natural gas extraction. OK, so what’s the deterrent then?
The Hezbollah-dominated Lebanese government wanted and needed cash flow from the Karish gas field to restart the collapsing Lebanese economy. Israeli leadership held crucial leverage over the Lebanese economy at a time when their politicians were desperate for a win. Yet with Israeli elections on the horizon, Lapid chose to revive the Lebanese economy in the hopes that conjuring images of the wildly popular Abraham Accords, guaranteeing “stability” in the north, and boosting the economy would help him secure another term.
The history of Israeli-Lebanon relations is fraught with error, and this maritime deal is no different. Israel has once again proven it does not understand the country to its north, its politics, or its economics. And this time, its mistakes are financing the world’s most powerful terrorist organization and Israel’s most potent enemy. It’s weird.
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