In Moment of “Maximum Danger,” the Navy Chooses Less Firepower

At the Reagan National Defense Forum this past weekend, two speakers echoed a similar theme: Tyrants respect force above all else.

When discussing the war in Ukraine, former Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta noted this is the most pivotal conflict since WWII, the United States cannot afford to lose in Ukraine, and the only way to get Vladimir Putin’s attention is by force.

In a panel later in the day, Senator Mike Rounds (R-SD) characterized the threat of China to the US, as well as Taiwan, and summarized his bottom line: The Chinese Communist Party respects force, period.

Bringing a view from the frontlines to the same event, US Indo-Pacific Command Commander Admiral John Acquilino said America must move faster. Specifically, he called on Washington to have a “sense of urgency to deliver . . . what is needed now to move as fast as possible to deliver deterrence.”

Despite the near unanimity among national security leaders, the US military continues to be stymied by bureaucracy while getting smaller and older as it awaits future technologies to come online.

According to a recent Congressional Budget Office (CBO) report, the most critical element of conventional deterrence—firepower—is in jeopardy over the coming decade. This is the same decade characterized as one of “maximum danger” for the US military in the Indo-Pacific.

The US Navy is due to see a 13 percent decline in the lethality of its fleet until 2032 under all three of the shipbuilding scenarios laid out in the service’s most recent 30-year shipbuilding plan(s). This decline comes from the service retiring more ships than it commissions over the next decade.

And by 2027, when China’s military is expected to be significantly modernized and, as a result, more capable of taking Taiwan by force, ship retirements will leave the Navy with 1,274 fewer vertical launching system cells (VLS) than it has today. VLS is a missile launcher for ships and submarines, and depending on the platform, each cell can hold a differing number and type of missile.

The significant loss in cells is due to retirements of guided missile submarines, Ticonderoga class cruisers, and Los Angeles class attack submarines. Some of these ship retirements will cause the Navy to experience a net loss of 486 Tomahawk missiles. Nor will the eight Virginia class submarines being delivered over the next five years be enough to make up for this loss in missile capacity.

The Navy faces the same problem with its cruisers. The Navy plans to replace these with upgraded Arleigh Burke destroyers. But, while the Ticonderogas hold 122 VLS cells each, the Arleigh Burkes will only field 96. Between next year and 2027, the Navy intends to retire seventeen of the Ticonderogas, as well as one older destroyer, while replacing them with fourteen Arleigh Burkes and one Constellation class frigate. That produces a net loss of 788 vertical launching system cells in the surface fleet alone.

Rep. Elaine Luria (D-VA) is an outspoken critic of the Navy’s loss of these cells, commenting, “We are losing 1,000+ cells, with no plan to replace them. Instead, we are investing in the next ‘Gucci’ missile and technology that will not be mature for 20+ years.”

She’s correct. The Navy needs more solutions to plug the gap in firepower while it waits for more ships and subs to be built. The service is right to be considering arsenal ships with remote firing capabilities and unmanned surface vessels that function as supplemental missile magazines. Its study of equipping bulk cargo and container ships with VLS is also a step in the right direction.

Leaders must work creatively to prevent any gaps in combat power at a time when there are no gaps in global threats.

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