House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s planned trip to Taiwan is a Rorschach test for US China watchers. Some believe Pelosi should cancel the visit because the United States should generally avoid actions that worsen tensions with China. Others argue that Pelosi should go because Washington should not back down in anticipation of pressure from Beijing.

But this
overlooks a critical strategic debate: whether this is the right time or topic
for a crisis. Even from the perspective of a supporter of Taiwan and frequent critic
of Beijing, conducting this visit now appears unwise.

I have argued that the United States can and should use crises with China to its advantage. Crises may not be desirable, but if carefully managed they can help build support both domestically and internationally. Unfortunately, Pelosi’s trip violates this strategic logic in three ways.

First, the timing
of this trip is poor. Some who believe a crisis with China is inevitable argue
that a near-term crisis might be advisable if it does not escalate into a
larger conflict. These observers note that Xi Jinping’s preparations for the
upcoming Party Congress could deter him from launching a major escalation. In
other words, they suggest that this might be the best time for a crisis because
it would put a ceiling on China’s willingness to escalate.

Unfortunately, although
the upcoming Party Congress could put a ceiling on China’s advertent escalation,
it also establishes a floor. With Chinese leaders meeting now at Beidaihe and
the Party Congress just months away, Xi will have to demonstrate resolve. Some
sort of forceful Chinese response is inevitable, and there are real risks of
accidental or inadvertent escalation.

The situation
would have been somewhat different in April, when Pelosi first planned to visit
Taiwan. At that time, Beijing had less time to prepare its response options. The
Party Congress was four months further away. Joe Biden had not yet muddied the
waters by suggesting the United States has a commitment to defend Taiwan. And
Mike Pompeo and Mark Esper had not yet traveled to Taipei and suggested doing
away with the “one China” policy.

So the timing of
this visit puts the United States in a difficult strategic position.

Second, Pelosi’s
trip is intended to enhance deterrence but could actually undermine it. To
deter China, the United States needs to demonstrate commitment and strengthen its
military capabilities as well as those of Taiwan. Pelosi’s visit has no impact
on American or Taiwanese military capabilities, yet it could end up undermining
perceptions of US resolve.

How might
Pelosi’s trip lead Beijing to question US resolve? Just two months ago, Joe
Biden effectively committed to coming to Taiwan’s defense. Critics will debate
the wisdom of his statement, but this crisis now places him in opposition to the
top member of Congress of his own party. This is hardly the recipe for building
consensus or signaling enhanced US commitment.

So the domestic
political dynamics of this visit could undermine deterrence.

Finally, Pelosi’s
trip may divide the United States from key allies and partners. Crises can be
useful if they inspire greater international cooperation and drive resources
accordingly. But US allies and partners have thus far been silent on Pelosi’s
visit. This despite the recent tendency of allies in both Asia and Europe to
publicly endorse peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait.

Indeed, informal
conversations with foreign officials and experts suggest that few are supportive
of Pelosi’s visit and most would tend to blame the United States for
precipitating a crisis. They see a pattern of recent US actions by a variety of
leaders as undermining the cross-strait status quo. American leaders will
rightfully argue that China should not escalate by creating a military crisis,
but these arguments are likely to fall on deaf ears in most foreign capitals.

So the
international reaction to this visit could weaken US coalition-building
efforts.

For all these
reasons, this is not the right time nor topic for a crisis with China. Pelosi’s
trip has substantial downside risk, yet little upside. The Chinese response to
her visit could precipitate a Fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis. And this one could
undermine not only cross-strait stability, but also the growing domestic and
international consensus around challenging China and supporting Taiwan.

Not all crises
are avoidable or even inadvisable. But this one is unusually risky from a
strategic perspective. Given the increasingly heated political rhetoric on this
issue, Pelosi is unlikely to back down. But leaders in Washington may well
regret allowing this crisis to emerge. All sides will have to work hard in
coming weeks to prevent this century’s eruption of the guns of August.

The post The Strategic Case Against Pelosi’s Trip to Taiwan appeared first on American Enterprise Institute – AEI.