The
leaders of NATO’s 30 allied nations will meet in Brussels this week as part of a
troika of summits (NATO, the EU, and the G-7) rushed together to demonstrate
Western solidarity in opposition to Russia’s brutal invasion of Ukraine. The
allies meet as Russia has failed to achieve its strategic objective of regime
change but continues its invasion and imposes terrible human and economic costs
on Ukraine.

NATO
has two objectives: deter escalation by Russia against NATO allies and prevent
Russian military success in Ukraine. We should take actions to give heart to
Ukrainians to keep fighting and discourage Russia from doing so.

Several allies are bringing proposals for greater direct support to Ukraine, including a no-fly zone. It satisfies an urgency to do something to assist Ukraine, and President Zelensky asked it of us, so it merits serious consideration. NATO operates on consensus, so nothing happens without unanimous agreement. Every NATO ally can stop decisions, but many often let them advance provided they are excluded from contributing. NATO allies could proceed to establish a no-fly zone without US participation, provided the US supported them doing so. But it’s also unlikely that NATO allies would go to war against Russia without the US at the helm. And as NATO air operations in Libya in 2011 revealed, allies rely on substantial US support even then.

But
establishing a no-fly zone is directly joining the war, and there are several
ways to help Ukraine protect their airspace without it. Ukrainians are having
great success with surface-to-air missiles, which NATO countries are supplying
by the thousands and should open the floodgates even further on supplying. NATO
should support countries sending planes Ukrainians can fly or cannibalize for
parts. There is no significant threshold between the weapons we are supplying
and the planes Ukraine is asking for.

The Biden administration has suggested an exquisite idea that NATO should take up, solving several problems at once: assisting Ukraine’s air defenses by sending Turkey’s Russian-made S-400 system to Ukraine. The S-400 has been a source of deep division between Turkey and the rest of NATO because of the information it can collect on NATO planes; replacing it with NATO-compliant systems would get Turkey out of the doghouse, reconnect NATO’s air defenses, give justification not to operate NATO aircraft in Ukraine, and give Ukraine the ability to target Russian planes as they enter Ukrainian airspace.

Poland’s Deputy Prime Minister advocates a NATO peacekeeping force, for which US forces were quickly ruled out. This was a mistake. President Biden should use the company of 29 NATO allies to walk back his earlier and repeated assurances to Russia that the United States would not send troops to Ukraine. Determining not to fight in defense of Ukraine is a responsible if regrettable presidential decision; but projecting our risk aversion risks encouraging rather than discouraging Russian aggression.

But
Poland’s idea is likely to keep Russia fighting, since it would effectuate
Russia’s fear of long-term stationing of NATO forces in Ukraine. Even if we
intend to station NATO forces in post-war Ukraine, discussion of that shouldn’t
precede Russia’s capitulation. Committing to Ukraine’s eventual NATO
membership, much as they deserve it, probably also encourages Russia to keep
fighting.

What
might encourage Russia’s capitulation is offering them a post-war restoration:
US-Russian negotiations on arms control, conditions under which sanctions will
be lifted, even NATO membership for a different kind of Russia, one that
becomes a contributor to European security. Even if responsibility for the
invasion is widely shared in the Russian leadership, personalizing culpability
onto Putin may encourage Russians to push him from power.

We
should also be talking to Ukraine’s leadership about their post-war
restoration: massive assistance to rebuild its cities, integration deeper into
the West, security guarantees. Russia’s $350 billion frozen central bank assets
in Western hands could be tapped for humanitarian assistance and
reconstruction.

And there are military actions NATO could take that could give Russia pause: mine-laying exercises that hint at the prospect of danger in Ukraine’s coastal waters and provision of coastal defense cruise missiles to Ukraine to threaten Russia’s fleet (21 ships) in the Black Sea. NATO could offer ships under Turkish command to patrol the Bosporus, as well.

The
US and NATO allies could increase pressure on Russian interests outside
Ukraine, too: reversing Russian successes in Syria and the Central African
Republic; increasing assistance to Moldova; recognizing Japanese claims to
islands Russia also claims in the Pacific. We have lots of pressure points that
Russia would have to divert attention from Ukraine to address.

NATO
should celebrate Germany’s bold policy changes — Chancellor Scholz deserves
lavish praise for his decision to add $100 billion this year to Germany’s
defense budget, commitment to meeting NATO’s 2 percent of GDP, and continuing
involvement in NATO’s nuclear mission. That’s a lot of money to push quickly
into a defense program, and NATO’s integrated military command should be tasked
to assist Germany in implementing the policy.

There are also non-military actions NATO, the EU, and G-7 can coordinate. Germany’s economics minister Robert Habeck said Germany would only cut off Russian oil and gas if Putin uses chemical or nuclear weapons in Ukraine; NATO and the EU should announce German commitment that plans are in place to enact the ban fast. NATO should further publicize the intelligence warning that Russia is planning chemical weapons use, and clearly communicate that the West will increase its military support to Ukraine, sponsor a UN war crimes investigation, and fully embargo Russian oil and gas if Russia’s military uses chemical weapons.

China
is evincing no buyer’s remorse for their treaty of unlimited friendship with Russia,
which came into effect just before the invasion. And Russia has evidently asked
China for help. NATO heads of state should also make a strong statement to
China that any material support for Russia’s aggression will trigger secondary
sanctions on China.

Even short of joining the war in defense of Ukraine’s sovereignty, there is much NATO can and should do to further increase the costs and risks to Russia for its barbarity.

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