Last week, the Pentagon released its 2021 China Military Power Report, an annual review of military and security developments in China. The report includes a number of updates on last year’s version — here are five top items to take note of:

1. Nuclear advancements:
Whereas the
2020 report surprised many by estimating that China’s stockpile of nuclear
warheads was in the low 200s, the 2021 version states: “The accelerating pace
of the PRC’s nuclear expansion may enable the PRC to have up to 700 deliverable
nuclear warheads by 2027. The PRC likely intends to have at least 1,000
warheads by 2030.” In addition, China “is implementing a launch-on warning
posture, called ‘early warning counterstrike.’” The report notes that “China
has commenced building three solid-fueled ICBM silo fields, which will
cumulatively contain hundreds of new ICBM silos.” These developments place
China “on the cusp of a large silo-based ICBM force expansion comparable to
those undertaken by other major powers.” Furthermore, “The PRC is also
supporting this expansion by increasing its capacity to produce and separate
plutonium by constructing fast breeder reactors and reprocessing facilities.”
In sum, these changes suggest that Beijing is reshaping its nuclear posture,
with significant implications for both nuclear and conventional escalation
dynamics.

2. Missiles developments:
Estimates of the
number of China’s ballistic missiles are up across the board. Inter-continental
ballistic missiles (ICBMs) are up to 150 from 100, and intermediate-range
ballistic missiles (IRBMs) have been clarified as numbering 300, a change from
the 200+ figure last year. However, launcher numbers remained the same for
both. Perhaps most notably, estimates for medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs)
are up considerably to 250 launchers and 600 missiles compared to 150 launchers
and 150+ missiles last year. Short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) went from
600+ to 1,000. Finally, ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs) were clarified as
numbering 300. Another development to watch was in hypersonics, with the report
noting that China has begun to field “its first operational hypersonic weapons
system, the DF-17 hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV) capable medium-range ballistic
missile (MRBM).” Combined with recent revelations about China’s testing of a
fractional orbital bombardment system, it is clear that Beijing is rapidly
expanding its missile capabilities.

3. Overseas capabilities: For the first
time, the 2020 report specifically
identified places China might be considering for potential bases and logistical
hubs. This year’s report highlights legal changes and military developments
aimed at advancing China’s overseas influence. It notes that a revision to the
National Defense Law “tasked the PLA with defending ‘overseas development
interests.’” The report also highlights China’s expeditionary capability,
noting the rapid development of “a limited capability to project ground power
as an expeditionary force . . . [including] to speed up its transition from
regional defense to trans-theater operations.” Platforms like ocean-going
amphibious transport docks, the Liaoning
and Shandong aircraft carriers, and
the 2020-commissioned Renhai-class cruiser are key to building out China’s
power projection capabilities. These capability changes reinforce our
expectation that China will accelerate development of power-projection systems
in coming years.

4. Cross-strait tensions: The 2021 report finds that China is expanding
its forces and capabilities relevant to military operations against Taiwan. The
total number of active-duty army personnel was the same in 2020 and 2021, but
this year 4,000 more are reportedly stationed near the Taiwan Strait. China
increased its landing ships and amphibious transport docks by 20, with 49 of 57
stationed near Taiwan. The report also notes that China has 15 more submarines
(diesel attack, nuclear attack, and ballistic missile versions) than last year.
Finally, China has increased its fighters by 100 overall. In addition, the
report comments that Chinese leaders believe “advanced technologies, such as
cloud computing and big data analytics, are changing the future of warfare
faster than expected.” China is seeking to use these capabilities to alter the
military balance across the Taiwan Strait and beyond.

5. China’s objectives: Last in this
list, but certainly not least, is a reframing of China’s objectives. The 2021
report explicitly describes China’s goals as seeking to “match or surpass U.S. global
influence and power, displace U.S. alliances and security partnerships in the
Indo-Pacific region, and revise the international order to be more advantageous
to Beijing’s authoritarian system and national interests.” The report goes on
to emphasize that China’s leaders view the competition in ideological terms and
warns that they “are increasingly willing to confront the United States and
other countries in areas where interest[s] diverge.” Tensions between the
United States and China continue to grow, and exchanges have been made more
difficult by the COVID-19 pandemic. These factors are to blame for a steep decline
in US-China military
exchanges, which fell from 18 last year to four this year. Overall, the 2021
China Military Power Report paints a picture of a country that is growing more capable
militarily while also adopting a more risk-acceptant posture.

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